Books : War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism

Rating: - I read this book too
Fact #1: State Dept is competent & trustworthy (anonymous sources say so)
Fact #2: CIA is competent & trustworthy (anonymous sources say so)
Fact #3: DoD is secretive and incompetent (anonymous sources say so)
So how can anyone write a book that disproves those facts?
Well, actually, it turns out it's really really easy to disprove those facts.

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Rating: - A dose of integrity.
The inside story of a defining moment of American character. Want to know what Colin Powel is really like? Want to know how much control the President really has over foreign policy? Read it.

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Rating: - A Drink In the Desert
At last, a sensible, informed history from one of the responsible participants in these events.

I think it is skilfully written and I found it a joy to read, not just for the language mastery and informed history, but for the careful clarity, perspective, humility and sensitive care in purpose. I think it is a valuable insight into some truly capable people in action; standing up, discerning and doing the right thing, and doing their best, even when its really challenging, even when there is voluminous opposition, and when the stakes are very, very high. People who will find a way to rise and meet a challenge no matter how high, and some who don't. I found it exciting and inspiring to read, and a wonderful example of how to behave well that I will treasure.

Clearly, the integrity of the free world was in some fine hands here.

I loved it. Thanks.

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Rating: - An excellent personal memoir
I have now finished the book but the number of negative reviews posted here still suggests that half a review by someone who has read the book carefully was better than what else is on offer so far. I have not altered my comments since reading the rest but have a few additional observations. This is a personal story of Feith's career in the DoD, before and during the Iraq War. He comments on contacts with others but he does not offer general statements or philosophy about matters that he is not personally familiar with. He does, however, offer some conclusions at the end about what was done well and what the mistakes were. He is honest about identifying his opinions and what he believes to be facts. This is a source document for the history that will be eventually written, hopefully fairly, about this period. I marked a number of sections because they impact the mythology of the war as illustrated in the other reviews and comments.

He is critical of Colin Powell, and especially, Richard Armitage, who seemed not to be as concerned with the post-Saddam situation yet who resisted anyone else treading on their turf. His first skirmish was in 2002 (page 173) when he attempted to set up an office, called Office of Strategic Influence, to counteract the Islamist propaganda about why violent jihad was becoming a threat. Some went back to the old "root causes" excuse yet the Saudi hijackers of 9/11 were upper middle class educated men. His effort came to naught when the office was attacked in a strategic leak from within the administration, followed by a sensational NY Times article that accused them of planning to spread false information. Another similar article was printed recently about another DoD effort to reach Muslims with honest information. In his conclusions, he points out that we still do not have any serious effort to counter jihadist rhetoric.

He refutes (page 197) another charge, prominent in another review here, that Chalabi was a "creature" of DoD and Feith was his "sponsor." One would think that the fact the Chalabi has been a major official in the Iraq government would put to rest that old CIA smear but it lives on on Amazon pages. He tells the story of CIA incompetence and the firestorm created when a 20-year DIA expert on his staff wrote a critical briefing (page 265) pointing out how CIA had ignored links between Saddam and al Qeada before the war. On page 278, he recounts another example of State's conflicted thinking where they advise against an "occupation" but their antipathy toward the "externals" (exiles like Chalabi) leads them to plan for a "many year" occupation and rule before an Iraqi government can be set up. The insurgency gained force from resentment at that policy. He points out with some understandable satisfaction that the "externals," including the Kurds who CIA predicted would not be accepted by other Iraqis, constituted almost the entire interim government that took over from Bremer and the CPA in 2004.

He has some mixed opinions about Paul Bremer, pointing out how Bremer took too much authority, resisting any consultation with Rumsfeld, his superior in the chain-of-command, and made a number of serious mistakes. The most serious one was excluding the Iraqis from governing their own country for as long as he did. The insurgency might never have gained the support of so much of the Sunni population had the "Occupation" not been so obvious.

I don't say this is the last word and Feith seems to resist many generalizations. This is an objective account and very valuable. He has his deficiencies. The most serious is the fact the he never mentions the tribal nature of the Iraqi society. This was a major mistake in the early history of our post-Saddam attempts to govern the country and fight the insurgency.

I have read many books on this subject and the ones I respect, beginning with The Threatening Storm by Kenneth Pollack, all mostly agree. For example, another review here mentions Bob Baer and his book about Aghanistan and Gary Berntsen and "Jawbreaker" also about Afghanistan. I have read both books and Baer, in particular, dismisses his CIA bosses pointing out the lack of language skills in CIA. This lack, and the ignorance of the culture, was a major factor in the CIAs poor performance in Iraq and is discussed by Feith. He is chiefly critical of CIA implying that their information was better sourced than it was. They concealed how few assets they had in Iraq (none) and led others astray who placed more faith in their reports than was warranted. Better to confess ignorance than mislead.

The dissent, like some of the other reviews here, comes with plenty of invective and obscenity but few facts. I still think this is an important book that anyone trying to understand our policy on fighting militant Islam should read. I'm sure Feith is evening a few scores here but he marshals lots of facts and refers to other documents to support his conclusions. This is an essential book, not least because he is such a controversial figure. The abuse he has taken from partisans is outrageous. At one point (page 388) he mentions a particularly odious slur attributed to Colin Powell by Bob Woodward in which Feith's office in the DoD is described as "a Gestapo office" ignoring the fact that Feith's father was a Holocaust survivor. Powell denied making the remark and apologized to Feith, whom he had known for 20 years, but the tone was set.

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Rating: - Finally! A narative not painted by Bush-haters!
Fascinating view of the first years of our War on Terrorism. Only Bush seems to make decisions based on the fact that our enemies had discovered how to fight their enemy (the USA) by bypassing our military and attacking citizens directly. Why the MSM doesn't understand that protecting us from such attacks has to be the main function of our Presidency is beyond me.
. . only their hatred for our country and hope for its downfall can explain the anti-war behavior. Noone wants war but to pretend it's not necessary is foolhardy. Bush's main goal (according to Feith) is that we not suffer another attack and in that he's been successful. I for one am grateful to President Bush for that. Feith finds errors on all sides (state dept, Defense Dept. but he's gives a full narrative not just the soundbitten biased report we now expect from the mainstream media. Anyone interested in the real story must read this book!